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Since the fall of the apartheid regime in South Africa, the oft-made anal-
ogy between the South African and Israeli cases has been extended to
suggest the applicability to the Palestinian quest for justice through
the rights discourse, arguably the most effective mobilizing tool in the
anti-apartheid struggle. This essay explores the suitability of the rights
approach by examining the South Africa–Israel analogy itself and the
relevance of the anti-apartheid model to the three main components
of the Palestinian situation: the refugees, the Palestinians of the occu-
pied territories, and the Palestinian citizens of Israel. It concludes that
while the rights discourse has many advantages, it cannot by its very
nature—the focus on law at the expense of historical context—address
the complexity of the Palestinian problem.
COMPARISONS HAVE LONG BEEN DRAWN between the apartheid regime of South
Africa and the State of Israel as practitioners of institutionalized, legalized
discrimination on ethnic and racial grounds. More recently, and especially
since the victory of the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa, the analogy
has been utilized not merely for rhetorical ends but to suggest a model
that could serve the Palestinians in their quest for justice. Specifically, the
analogy suggests to many that the most visible and effective component of
the anti-apartheid strategy—the rights discourse, which succeeded in creating
a worldwide solidarity movement that played a not insignificant role in the
ultimate defeat of the apartheid system—can be similarly effective in the
Palestinian case. It is the contention of this essay the South Africa–Israel
analogy should be pursued with caution; while the analogy is powerful
and allows us to see aspects of reality that have remained hidden, like all
analogies it tends to hide other aspects of that same reality. And just as the
basic analogy is limited, so privileging the rights discourse in the Palestinian
case could involve certain pitfalls arising both from the profound differences
between the two cases (alongside their similarities), and from the tendency
of the rights discourse, with its view of law as universal, to ignore historical
context.
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The real subject of this essay, then, is the rights discourse, its potential and
limitations, and the question of context as it relates to that discourse. To clarify
these issues, however, it is necessary first to revisit the Israel-apartheid analogy,
not with any claim to comprehensiveness, but with the aim of highlighting
those elements with bearing on the applicability of the rights discourse and
of exploring the preconditions that render the rights discourse effective or
otherwise.
Although the rights discourse can mean many things, in this paper I use it to
refer to a discourse that believes in its own power to effect social and political
change. This belief rests on the assumption that there are objective, shared
values that can serve as a cornerstone—the Archimedean point—capable of
adjudicating moments of conflict. The basic idea is that the universality of rights
creates a common ground allowing everyone—oppressors and oppressed—to
find their place and participate in the discourse. Accordingly, while the struggle
of the oppressed exerts pressure on the oppressor, at the same time it offers
the possibility of a universal way out of the conflict: the quest for liberation by
the oppressed creates the conflict and the solution to the conflict at the same
time.
The rights discourse presumes the centrality of law and assumes that equal
application of the law will lead to justice: the legal transcends the political
and restrains it. In its most familiar version, the discourse emphasizes the in-
dividual as the center and beneficiary of political organization, with rights
intended to limit the state’s interference in the protected autonomy of the
individual, leaving him a “free” sphere. At the same time, the sense of same-
ness, commonality, or common-belongingness shared by all the parties in-
volved is seen as coming before that which differentiates them. It is impor-
tant to point out that in the most notable cases where the rights discourse
was successful—the South African case and in the U.S. civil rights move-
ment of the 1960s—the struggle was not simply for human rights but for civil
rights. The demand by both the South African and the American blacks was
to enjoy the same rights and to be subject to the same laws as the dominant
population.
I should point out that I do not subscribe to the view that the law is epiphe-
nomenal or merely a superstructure. There is no doubt that the rights discourse,
premised on law, has its own dynamic and power. Those who use for oppres-
sive ends a legal system based on the universal principles of justice that lie
at the heart of the rights discourse can be trapped by their own rhetoric: the
founding fathers of the United States, for example, could not have imagined
that the words of their constitution would one day be used to grant equal po-
litical rights to African Americans. Thus, the universality of law, and the power
of discourse itself, can lead to results completely at odds with the intentions
of the drafters of the laws or of those who deploy the legal discourse. In the
final analysis, law is not merely at the service of politics, and normativity is not
simply the shadow of power. Law shapes politics just as politics shapes the
legal world.1
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THE ANTI-APARTHEID STRUGGLE IN SOUTH AFRICA
For someone who followed the struggle of the South African blacks from afar,
the struggle could have seemed to have an almost aesthetic feel. Their demands,
clear-cut and neat, were articulated with concision and clarity. It was easy to
grasp the symmetry that the struggle aimed to achieve, where all South Africans
would share the same basic rights; the imagined symmetry itself conveyed the
asymmetry of the apartheid situation. By showing the whole, one can see what
is missing—the absent rights of the black community became clear, concrete,
framed, and (as such) visible. It was like showing a picture of a man without
hands and asking: what is missing from the picture? We experience what is
missing or flawed in relation to an imagined or framed totality.
At the heart of apartheid lies the concept of exclusion. But in order to ex-
clude something, or to think of it as excluded, it is necessary first to imagine the
possibility of inclusion. One cannot think of French people as being excluded
from the right to vote in the U.S. presidential elections, because their inclusion
was never envisaged. On the other hand, one might have conceived of blacks in
the nineteenth century United States as having been excluded, because there
was a totality (the American people) of which they were presumably a part,
but from which they were in fact excluded.
In similar fashion, apartheid—which means “to put apart” or “to separate”—
presupposes its opposite; one can only “put apart” something that is already
together, or conceivable as being together, conceivable as a potential whole.
Apartheid as a concept becomes thinkable only against the background of
a certain unity, a common frame that encompasses the two parts, however
separate. If the parts come together, ending their separateness, the apartheid is
ended. By the same token, if the frame collapses, the apartheid also collapses, or
at least becomes invisible. It is the frame that allows us to see apartheid clearly
and that gives the term meaning. Without the frame, without that implied unity,
we are simply in a situation of differend, where the two parties are so lacking
in common norms that there are no grounds on which their conflict can be
adjudicated.2
Simplifyng the case somewhat, South Africans, at least in the years leading
up to the end of the apartheid system, were moving, however haltingly, toward
a certain sense of common belongingness: both blacks and whites were seeing
themselves as South Africans. As it became increasingly apparent that sepa-
ration was ultimately not viable in the long run, political slogans like “South
Africa for South Africans” and “one man, one vote” became powerful mobiliz-
ers for political action. The struggle of the blacks for individual civil, political,
economic, and social rights was conducted within a given frame—the state of
South Africa—and as such assumed an integrational, universalist shape with
centripetal powers. Significantly, the state itself was not in dispute as a form
or as the potential bearer of duties; the two sides differed on the allocation
of rights, not on the fact that a central body to which they both would owe
allegiance should allocate them.3
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THE PALESTINIAN CASE AND THE APARTHEID CONCEPT
That the apartheid model has relevance to the Palestinians is clear, given
the basic similarities between the Israeli and South African cases as manifested
in the dream of the rulers of both states to create a “pure” entity where the
“other” is excluded. At the same time, the differences between the Israeli and
South African histories and situations have evident bearing on those victim-
ized by these histories and situations—the Palestinians and the South African
blacks. Thus, the defining feature of the Palestinian case, in contrast to that of
the South African blacks, is fragmentation; the Palestinian experience has so
many different facets that it is impossible to subsume them all under a single
term like Apartheid. The most obvious aspect of this fragmentation is the fact
that Palestinians today form three distinct groups: refugees (the Palestinians in
exile); the Palestinians of the occupied territories, and the Palestinians of Israel.
The applicability of the apartheid concept to each case is discussed below.
The Refugees
The refugees, who form the largest of the three groups, can themselves be
divided into three categories: the refugees of the 1948 war, those who became
refugees after the 1967 war, and the “internal refugees” who were driven from
their homes and lands in 1948 but who live in the State of Israel as Israeli
citizens.4 Aside from the “internal refugees,” the concept of apartheid is by
definition inapplicable to the refugees, since they are in exile, scattered in
other countries and not subject to Israeli rule. Indeed, the very concept of
apartheid presupposes a presence within the country while being excluded
from (being outside) the rights regime. Still, despite the basic inapplicability
of the apartheid concept to the refugees, looking at the refugee issue from this
perspective is useful insofar as it sheds light on the relationship between the
Israeli case and apartheid.
The main experience shared by all Palestinian refugees is one of loss, dis-
placement, dispossession, and exile. The Palestinian question was a question
of refugees and of displacement before it became a question of statehood and
self-determination.5 For the refugees, it seems to me, the main issue is cap-
tured in the concept of return. Just as the negation of apartheid is equality and
integration, so the negation of the exile is return. And if for the Palestinians
the goal of return presumes equality (i.e., return not as second class citizens
but as citizens with equal rights), “integration” would not appear to be part of
the refugee agenda. And if in the South African case the geographical-political
entity was the locus of the struggle, in the Palestinian case the struggle was
over the geographical-political entity itself. In the first case the demand was
for equality, in the second equality is implied in the demand for return but
bears different meaning. In the Palestinian sense, the equality pursued is equal-
ity of the right to the land, as distinguished from equal rights on the land. In
this regard, the concept of apartheid does not capture the refugees’ current
situation.
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In the war of 1948, some 750,000 Palestinians were driven out of or fled from
their homes in what was to become Israel. Without this radical demographic
upheaval, Israel would not have had a Jewish majority. It hardly matters whether
this deportation was planned or merely “improvised” in the course of the war,
what is beyond question is that it was implicit in the Zionist project from the
very outset.6 It could be argued that there was no need for specific “plans”
to deport the Palestinians because their deportation was “written” into the
program of the Jewish state, albeit between the lines. It was the subtext of the
text itself.7
The physical expulsion, or disappearance, of the Palestinians in 1948—
Chaim Weizmann’s “miraculous clearing of the land”—made their expulsion
Israel thus spared itself
the necessity of imposing a
classical Apartheid regime
within its borders through
the mechanism of
expulsion.
from the legal text unnecessary. Populations that are
expelled and therefore absent do not need to be dis-
criminated against; discrimination is a sign of presence.
Israel thus spared itself the necessity of imposing a clas-
sical apartheid regime within its borders through the
mechanism of expulsion, through which it secured a
Jewish majority inside the state. Once the Palestinians
were only a minority, they could be allowed the vote
and some minimal political and civil rights. Israeli democracy—limited as it
is—was made possible on the back of the demographic change.8
In South Africa, there was no comparable demographic upheaval—there,
the transfers and “removals,” however massive, had been internal, and the
uprooted population remained inside the borders. As a result, apartheid became
inevitable (given the ideology of the country’s rulers) as a means of keeping the
“undesired” communities separate even as they remained within the country.
Apartheid in practice, then, was not a one-shot deal but a continuing “event”
in the here and now, which is what made it visible. The 1948 expulsion, by
contrast, was an intensified moment of violence, the historical facts of which
have since been obscured by a forest of opposing claims, aided by the passage of
time and the rooting of new realities. Yet it is the concentrated violence of 1948
which, by securing a Jewish majority, allows the machinery of the legal system
to work “smoothly” and “noiselessly,” the relatively tranquil surface masking
the harsh underlying reality.
The Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza
If the category of apartheid is essentially irrelevant in the case of the Pales-
tinian refugees in exile, the situation on the ground in the occupied territories
increasingly resembles an apartheid reality—separation wall, fencing in of en-
claves, parallel laws, closures, pass system, roads for Jews only, restrictions
on water use for Palestinians only, land confiscations, closed military areas im-
posed at will, and so on. Yet despite an objective situation that seems to be
moving toward de facto apartheid, the situation in the occupied territories is
still not perceived as apartheid by either party or by the international com-
munity. There is no agreement on the frame, on a defined entity/area within
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which the struggle is being waged. And in order for apartheid to be apartheid
(i.e., in order for it to constitute a political category, a lens through which the
reality can be seen and judged), the perception of an apartheid situation is as
necessary as the physical reality of separation.
The occupied territories have an ambivalent status in Israeli opinion. Though
the entire area is under Israeli control, in the eyes of the Israeli public the ter-
ritories can be either “here” or “there,” either “part” of Israel or “outside” it,
depending on the context. When it comes to confiscating land, building set-
tlements, using water resources, and so on, the occupied territories have been
seen as “inside” Israel ever since 1967. But when it comes to the Palestini-
ans who live there, the territories have always most definitely been seen as
being “out there” or “beyond the borders”—a perception that is very helpful
precisely in keeping the Palestinian population outside the Israelis’ imagined
political community. Without even the most minimal commonality that would
mark an “inside” or a shared frame, Israelis feel no more ethical, moral, or legal
obligations toward the Palestinians than they would toward any other foreign-
ers. Indeed, Israeli opinion by no means takes for granted their continuing
presence in the occupied territories. The transfer of Palestinians (both in the
territories and in Israel proper) beyond the borders of Mandatory Palestine is a
matter of public debate in the Israeli media; some Knesset members and even
certain government ministers openly call for it.
Most Palestinians saw the signing of the Oslo agreements and the establish-
ment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) as a step toward achieving their goal
of an independent state—complete separation from Israel. In reality, it further
entrenched the dual mechanism that allowed Israel to see the occupied ter-
ritories as part of Israel when it came to land exploitation and separate from
Israel when it came to responsibility for the Palestinian population. Land con-
fiscations and settlement expansion continued during the Oslo period as never
before; on the ground, Oslo was simply the continuation of the occupation by
remote control, mediated by the presence of a quasi-government with a flag,
ministers, and a president. With regard to the territories, Israel and the PA were
in exactly opposite positions: Israel post-Oslo continued to enjoy the benefits
of sovereignty without bearing the burden of responsibilities, while the PA was
given the responsibilities of statehood without being given any of the authority
or powers of a state.
Internationally, despite the de facto continuation of the occupation, the
existence of the PA conveys the impression of two states. With the occupied
territories no longer seen, internationally, as part of the Israeli body politic, any
conflict inside the territories is seen not as part of a struggle against occupation
but as a war across borders. As such, there is no restraint on Israel’s use of force
against the Palestinians except with regard to actions expressly prohibited by
the laws of war. Thus we are witnessing Israeli air raids on populated areas and
the vigorous implementation of an official policy of assassination. These actions
do not raise serious public debate within Israel, and within the international
community they are greeted with a remarkable degree of “understanding.”
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Thus, the situation of the Palestinians in the occupied territories is worse
than apartheid in that the world does not react when Israel uses F-16s to bomb
entire apartment buildings in order to kill this or that Palestinian leader—
which, incidentally, the South African apartheid government never did. Israel
can act with such impunity because, since the Palestinians are not citizens, the
normative rules of how a state deals with its citizens do not apply. Moreover,
So while the physical
facts on the ground are
taking us from the Algerian
model toward the South
African model, the political
understanding of the
Palestinians remains one
of decolonialization.
the fact that the struggle is seen and articulated in terms
of decolonialization rather than of anti-apartheid
means that there can be no anti-apartheid-type move-
ment. The belief of most Palestinians is that the strug-
gle is for independence, for separation, for two states,
not for integration and equality in one state. The result
is that the powers are centrifugal, not centripetal, and
the rights debated are not individual civil and political
rights but group rights (self-determination). So while
the physical facts on the ground are taking us from the
Algerian model toward the South African model, the political understanding of
the Palestinians remains one of decolonialization.
In light of the above, if the Palestinians of the occupied territories wanted
to adopt the model of the anti-apartheid struggle, they would have to pose the
questions: What could be the equivalent in our case of the “freedom charter”
or the slogan “South Africa for the South Africans”? Could we say “Israel for
Israelis”? But the Palestinians in the occupied territories are not Israelis. Could
we say “Palestine for Palestinians?” But the Jews are not Palestinians. Do we have
the vocabularies to “transplant” such slogans? Can our demands or our vision
be articulated in anti-apartheid terms, or must a new language be invented to
fit our case?
The Palestinians in Israel
It is tempting to compare the South African case to that of the Palestini-
ans who live inside Israel, who are Israeli citizens and who constitute about
20 percent of the Israeli population. The fact that Israel is a defined political en-
tity, governed by law, within borders that are internationally recognized (even
if not seen as definitive by Israel itself) means that there is a frame within which
talk of apartheid becomes possible and meaningful. In this sense, the Israeli
legal system has the unity, the form, and the “wholeness” against which the
“putting apart” can be envisaged.
It is not my purpose here to catalog in any comprehensive fashion the forms
of institutional discrimination practiced in various spheres against Israel’s Pales-
tinian citizens. Since the lifting in 1966 of martial law imposed on all Palestinian
areas when the state was founded, the most important form of discrimination
concerns the allocation of scarce resources. More than 50 percent of the land
belonging to the Palestinians who remained in Israel has been confiscated.
House demolitions under various pretexts continue to target the Palestinian
communities, infrastructure development and education in Palestinian areas
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lag far behind Jewish areas, and so on.9 Not a single new Palestinian village or
town has been established since the creation of the state.10 There are restric-
tions on Palestinian citizens’ right to buy or use even “public land” administered
by the state, to say nothing of the ban on non-Jewish use of the land under the
jurisdiction of the quasi-governmental Jewish National Fund (JNF) and Jewish
Agency (JA).11 These limitations, and others regarding planning, construction,
and development, confine the Palestinians to small “islands” or de facto “ghet-
tos,” creating a system of separation between the two national groups that has
been compared to apartheid.12
On the other hand, as mentioned above, the Palestinians in Israel, because
they constitute a minority not a majority, have been given a measure of political
participation over the years that South African blacks under apartheid never
had.13 Palestinian citizens of Israel participate in general elections, elect their
own representatives to the Israeli Knesset, and enjoy some freedom of expres-
sion, association, and other political and civil rights. In recent years there has
been increasing recourse to the Israeli High Court to achieve individual and
group rights for the Palestinian minority. This process has not thus far resulted
in any real structural changes, though at least at the formal legal level some
improvements have been registered.14
It is significant that it was not until 1995, after the Oslo accords, that a case
was brought before the High Court challenging the ban on Palestinian access
to state lands.15 The fact that such a blatantly discriminatory policy—which
amounts to legal separation, i.e., apartheid—went unchallenged for so many
years shows that Israel’s Palestinian citizens, like the Jewish majority, had not
taken the category of citizenship seriously. On another level, it could be argued
that the delay in seeking legal redress shows that the Palestinians did not see
themselves as being merely discriminated against but, much worse, as being
“outside” the system, on the other side of a zero-sum game where the state is an
enemy bent on dispossessing them completely and erasing their national iden-
tity. In a sense, the rhetoric of anti-discrimination that gained currency in the
late 1970s and was rearticulated in the 1990s under the slogan “Israel, a state for
all its citizens” was actually a sign that the Palestinians were reconciling them-
selves to the existence of the state, an indication that the Palestinian minority
had begun to take Israeli citizenship seriously. During the 1980s and 1990s,
partly under the impact of the limited rights discourse that was gaining ground
in those years, a thin sense of commonality within Israel began to emerge. But
the continuing structural differences mentioned above16 weakened the frag-
ile notion of common citizenship, which has almost entirely vanished since
October 2000, when Israel’s Palestinian citizens held demonstrations protest-
ing Israeli violence in the occupied territories just after the outbreak of the
al-Aqsa intifada and during which thirteen Israeli Palestinians were shot dead
by Israeli police.17
Despite the parallels that exist between South Africa’s apartheid regime and
the situation of the Palestinian citizens of Israel, a number of important factors
make the analogy problematic. In contrast to South Africa, where there was no
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disagreement about the contours of the land in which the struggle was being
waged, in Israel, as we have seen, what is “inside” and what is “outside” is left
open among Israelis. Above and beyond the issue of the actual geographical
borders—Israel pointedly refused to fix international borders at the end of the
1948 war and no longer recognizes the 1967 green line separating it from the
occupied territories—there are a number of ways in which the Israeli polity is
fluid, making the very idea of borders, as Oren Yiftachel put it, “very fuzzy.”18
Primary among these is the law of return, which grants all Jews, wherever they
live, the right to immigrate to Israel and to obtain Israeli citizenship immedi-
ately upon arrival. With millions of Jews thus entitled to actualize their potential
citizenship, a large part of the Israeli polity lies outside the state; indeed, as a
Jewish state with the right of return, the “essence” of the state could be said
to lie outside itself. A second complicating issue is the fact that well over half
the land in Israel is administered not by the state but by the JNF and the JA,
which hold these lands in trust for the Jewish people the world over; the land is
mandated by law to benefit not Israel’s citizens but Jews, whether they are cit-
izens or not. A third issue blurring what is “inside” and what is “outside” Israel
is the settlements in the occupied territories, which are subject to Israeli law
just as if they were part of Israel. Israeli law extends its jurisdiction “outside”
the state irrespective of the state borders.19 And at the same time that Israel
considers the settlements to be “inside” (even though they lie outside interna-
tionally recognized borders), within Israel proper there are entire Palestinian
villages that are not recognized by the authorities, are deemed “illegal,” and
do not receive state services. These so-called “unrecognized villages,” most of
which were inhabited before the establishment of the state, are geographically
“inside” the country, but in terms of their legal status, they are for all practical
purposes “outside” the state’s responsibilities (though the inhabitants can vote
on an individual basis).
Besides the absence of a clearly delineated frame, there is a second factor
that seriously undermines the applicability of the apartheid model in the case
of the Palestinians of Israel. Whereas in South Africa the blacks, whites, and
“coloreds” all considered themselves South Africans, the situation is far more
ambiguous in Israel, where, as we have seen, even in the best of times the
civic “we” that had tentatively begun to emerge was always permeated and
even overridden on both sides by a national “we.” Furthermore, in Israel it is
not simply a question of two national communities struggling over the same
territory. Beyond this, each community understands itself as part of a larger
nationality whose members are living outside the land. As such, neither of
the involved parties considers itself to be fully “present”; the Palestinians have
their refugees, and the Israeli Jews have their potential immigrants. Thus the
question of equality becomes problematic. Equality is the negation of discrim-
ination, but discrimination has relevance only in relation to the same compar-
ative lens. For example, when comparing Jews and Palestinians within Israel,
the case of discrimination is clear, and the demand for equality makes sense.
But what if we widen the lens and consider all Palestinians (Israeli citizens
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plus refugees) in relation to the Jews of Israel, or the Palestinians of Israel with
regard to all Jews (Israeli citizens plus Diaspora)? Where do we stop in the
comparison? And how are we to adjudicate between their demands? Added
to the fuzzy nature of borders, then, is the fuzzy nature of the populations
involved.
These qualifications notwithstanding, the case of Israel proper is certainly
that in which the rhetoric of rights can have the greatest effect. Slogans such
as “Israel, state for all its citizens” can have meaning, and indeed has become
part of a political program and inspired a vision for the future.
THE RIGHTS DISCOURSE AND THE RIGHT TO CONTEXT
The rights discourse, at least in part thanks to the success of the anti-
apartheid movement in South Africa and the civil rights movement in the
United States (and leaving aside the interesting debate about the extent to
which these movements actually achieved their aims on the ground), has come
to be seen by many minorities or oppressed groups as a basic, even primary,
tool in their struggle for justice. In no case, perhaps, has the applicability of
the South African model been claimed with greater insistence than with re-
gard to the Palestinian case. Yet, as we have seen, the category of apartheid
cannot describe the complexity of the Palestinian situation. Whereas the rights
discourse is effective in a bounded situation, within an agreed upon “frame”
(e.g., the South African state, the United States), in the Palestinian case there
is no such frame: the apartheid model does not apply either to the situation of
the refugees in exile (the majority of the Palestinians) or to that of the Pales-
tinians in the occupied territories. The model is inadequate even with regard
to the segment of the Palestinian people to which it most applies—the Pales-
tinian citizens of Israel—because the core of the issue goes beyond the legal
discrimination from which they are suffering at present.
One of the shortcomings of the rights discourse in general is that, being
based on law, by definition it seeks to remedy a status quo, a situation as it now
stands. Law being universal, it is applied to all situations as if they were equal; it
operates on a situation as if it were an abstract entity rather than the product of
a given history with a given context. Indeed, the rights discourse, deriving from
the universality of law, almost inevitably dehistoricizes and decontextualizes the
subject, cutting it off from its particularity. Thus, while there are indisputable
gains in wielding the rights discourse, there are losses as well—the greatest
being the loss of context. The Palestinian case, for example, when seen from a
historical perspective, looks clear and simple: the story of one people taking
the land of another people. But seen from a static point of view (the point of
view of most legal theorists), it looks shattered and fragmented.
This being the case, to compare the Palestinian situation to that of other
racial or ethnic groups in the world—specifically to that of the South African
blacks under apartheid—is misleading, because the core of the Palestinian
problem lies not in the specific demands of the three categories—the right
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to return by the refugees in exile, for self-determination and an independent
state by the Palestinians in the occupied territories, or for equal rights by the
Palestinians in Israel—but in the concept of loss. One might even argue that
giving primacy to the rights discourse in the Palestinian quest for justice could
represent some dangers, because a rights discourse entails the renunciation of
the frame, the historical context. Focusing on legal redress implies renunciation
of the historical context and therefore renunciation of the right to address in
some fashion the wider losses. Seen from this perspective, the very demands
of the three groups represent in each case a historical compromise from the
very outset.
I am by no means suggesting that use of the rights discourse be discarded
in the Palestinian struggle; as the main language currency used by people all
over the world, it remains very empowering despite its limitations. But it must
be used in a way that reintroduces the totality of the Palestinian experience
that was fragmented in 1948. (Yet the very reintroduction of this totality puts
it in tension with the generally dehistoricizing rights approach.) My principal
argument is that the Palestinians have lost not only their rights and their land,
but also the context that enables them to demand these rights in a way that
makes sense. Context is the background condition that allows us to speak and
imbues our words with meaning, and the reclaiming of context is the reclaiming
of language. In this regard, the first and basic right for the Palestinians in seeking
a measure of justice is the right to context, the right to seek redress within the
framework of their loss. Much effort, I believe, needs to be directed toward
reclaiming this right.
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